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Video Software Dealers Association v. Schwarzenegger:
Defining the Constitutional Perimeter around State
Regulation of Violent Video Games
David S. Dubinsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
In modern day society, the stigma attached to controversial video
games-those involving blood, gore, profanity, and sexual themes-extends
far beyond the typical social setting. It has pervaded and percolated down
into the jurisprudence of our nation as society wrestles with how best to
balance freedom, exploration, and entertainment with healthy physical and
psychological development in children. This case originates from the Cali-
fornia State Legislature's attempt to do just that. The issue is whether
§§ 1746-1746.5 of the recently-enacted California Civil Code ("the Act"),
"which impose restrictions and a labeling requirement on the sale or rental of
'violent video games' to minors, . . . violate rights guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.",
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Act was subject to
strict scrutiny "as a presumptively-invalid content-based restriction on
speech."2 The court found that the Act failed strict scrutiny because the State
did not demonstrate a compelling interest, did not narrowly tailor the Act to
further its asserted interests, and did not utilize the least-restrictive means
available to advance such interests.3 The court premised its decision prima-
rily on the rather dubious social-science evidence supplied by the State to
support the alleged causal connection between minors playing violent video
games and their subsequent violent or antisocial behavior.4 A cursory survey
of similar cases reveals that the fatal flaw in governmental attempts to regu-
late the availability of violent video games to minors is the flimsy social
science it relies on to establish a causal link between minors playing such
games and subsequent violent or antisocial tendencies.5
* David S. Dubinsky is a 2011 candidate for a Doctorate of Jurisprudence from
Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. He would like to
thank his many friends for their inspiration and influence in his growth as a
writer, jurist, and person. He would also like to thank his mother, father, and
brother for their support, as well as Jesus Christ, through Whom all things are
possible.
1. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 952-53 (9th
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3627 (U.S. April 26, 2010) (No. 08-
1448).
2. Id. at 953.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 964.
5. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 958-
59 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244
F.3d 572, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Entm't Software Ass'n v.
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II. FACT SITUATION
Plaintiffs Video Software Dealers Association and Entertainment
Software Association (collectively "Video Software") "are associations of
companies that create, publish, distribute, and sell or rent video games."6
Defendants consist of various California state and local officials (collectively
"the State"), all acting in their official capacities, including Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr.7 On October
7, 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law Assembly Bill 1179,
codified as California Civil Code §§ 1746-1746.5.8 The Act states that "[a]
person may not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent
video game to a minor."9 Violators are subject to a civil penalty of up to
$1,000.10 Prior to the Act going into effect, Video Software filed an action to
contest its constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
Section 1746 of the Act defines a "violent video game" as follows:
(d)(1) "Violent video game" means a video game in which
the range of options available to a player includes killing, maim-
ing, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human
being, if those acts are depicted in the game in a manner that does
either of the following:
Comes within all of the following descriptions:
(i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole,
would find that it appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the
community as to what is suitable for minors
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value for minors
(B) Enables the player to virtually inflict serious injury upon
images of human beings or characters with substantially human
characteristics in a manner which is especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved in that it involves torture or serious physical abuse to the
victim. 12
Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also Entm't
Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 404 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982 (E.D. Mich. 2005); see
also Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1188-89
(W.D. Wash. 2004).
6. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 952.
7. Id. at 952.
8. Id. at 953.
9. Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.1(a) (West 2006).
10. Id. at § 1746.3.
I1. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 955.
12. Cal. Civ. Code § 1746(d)(1) (West 2006).
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In addition, the Act imposes a labeling requirement on all violent video
games in § 1746.2:
Each violent video game that is imported into or distributed
in California for retail sale shall be labeled with a solid white "18"
outlined in black. The "18" shall have dimensions of no less than
2 inches by 2 inches. The "18" shall be displayed on the front face
of the video game package.13
III. DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
Video Software initially filed suit in federal court in the Northern Dis-
trict of California before the Act took effect.14 Video Software sought de-
claratory relief on the grounds that the Act violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.15 It argued: (1)
the Act was a facially invalid restriction on freedom of expression due to its
regulation of content and a violation of equal protection;16 and (2) that
through the Act's labeling requirement, California unconstitutionally im-
posed its own subjective opinion regarding content of certain video games
sold within the state.' 7
IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
The court, granted Video Software's motion for a preliminary injunction
after weighing the hardships. The court balanced the Act's unconstitutional
abridgement of free expression against the potential injury to the California
State Legislature by striking down the Act as unconstitutional.18 It concluded
that Video Software, its members, and minors throughout California could
potentially suffer irreparable harm if the court failed to preliminarily enjoin
the Act. The court determined that such harm would greatly outweigh the
potential irreparable harm to the legislature by preliminarily enjoining the
Act.19 The court recognized that Video Software had shown a strong likeli-
hood of success on the merits,20 and the implementation of the regulatory
scheme imposed by the Act would be costly and burdensome, with potential
to cause irreparable harm to Video Software.21 Granting a preliminary in-
13. Id. at § 1746.2.
14. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034,
1037-38 (N.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009).
15. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 955.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 965.
18. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1047-48.
19. Id. at 1047-48.
20. Id. at 1043.
21. Id. at 1047.
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junction would merely delay the State's enforcement of the Act for a short
time, pending appellate review of its constitutionality.22 Finding that the bal-
ance of hardships "tips sharply in [Video Software's] favor," the district
court granted Video Software's motion for a preliminary injunction.23 In fur-
ther support of its decision to grant the preliminary injunction, the district
court also found that Video Software had "shown they are likely to succeed
on the merits of their claim that, or at least have raised serious questions
about whether the Act's labeling provision violates the First Amendment."24
Subsequently, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and
the district court granted Video Software's motion, denied the State's cross-
motion, and permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act. 25 The State then
filed a timely appeal.26
V. NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING AND OVERVIEW OF RATIONALE
The court held: (1) the Act was subject to strict scrutiny as a presump-
tively-invalid content-based restriction on speech; (2) the Act violates the
First Amendment because the State failed to demonstrate a compelling inter-
est, failed to narrowly tailor the Act to further its asserted interests, and failed
to utilize the least-restrictive means necessary to advance such interests;27
and (3) the Act's labeling requirement, requiring that the front of the packag-
ing of a violent video game contain a four-square-inch label reading "18,"
was unconstitutional as government-compelled speech. 28 The language of
the opinion, however, implies that this result was necessitated by the court's
earlier holding that the Act violates the First Amendment.29 If the court had
upheld the Act, the justifications proffered by the State for the labeling re-
quirement may very well have been sufficient to fall within an exception for
commercial speech that "dissipate[s] the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception."30
22. Id. at 1047-48.
23. Id. at 1048.
24. Id. at 1047.
25. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188, 2007
WL 2261546 at I (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
26. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 956.
27. Id. at 953.
28. Id. at 967.
29. See id. at 966.
30. Id.
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VI. COURT'S RATIONALE
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with by acknowledging that the
proper standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is de novo.31 On
appeal, the State conceded that the alternative definition of "violent video
games," as delineated in § 1746(d)(1)(B), is unconstitutionally broad.32 This
is because the definition fails to provide an exception for material that has
some redeeming value to minors.33 As a result, Video Software argued that
the Act should be invalidated on this basis alone.34 However, § 1746.5 pro-
vides that "the provisions of this title are severable. If any provision of this
title or its application is held to be invalid, that invalidity shall not affect
other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application."35 Thus, the State argued that the Act's severability
clause rendered it immune as a whole from a finding of unconstitutionality
with regards to § 1746(d)(1)(B).36 The court held that the Act is not wholly
invalid as a result of the State's concession because, under California law,
there is a general presumption in favor of a statute's constitutionality.37 Ad-
ditionally, the court held that § 1746(d)(1)(B) is "grammatically, function-
ally, and volitionally separable" because it can be removed as a whole
without affecting the wording of any of the measure's other provisions, and
because it was not of critical importance to the passage of the Act.38 In fact,
the court notes that the only purpose the legislature contemplated in includ-
ing the alternative definition of a "violent video game" in the Act was to
avoid the constitutional pitfalls identified in Video Software Dealers Associa-
tion v. Maleng,39 where a similar legislative enactment was invalidated as
unconstitutionally vague.40
The State also conceded on appeal that (1) video games are a form of
expression protected by the First Amendment, and (2) the Act seeks to re-
strict expression in video games based on their content.41 Nevertheless, the
State argued that because the Act targets only minors, the court should apply
31. Id. at 956.
32. Id. at 954, n.5.
33. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 954.
34. Id. at 956.
35. Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.5 (2010).
36. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 956.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 956.
39. Id. at 957.
40. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1191.
41. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958, (noting that, while the Supreme Court has
not expressly addressed whether video games contain expressive content pro-
tected under the First Amendment, story-laden video games are similar to mov-
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the "variable obscenity" test of Ginsberg v. New York42 instead of strict scru-
tiny.43 Ginsberg held that a state could prohibit the sale of sexually-explicit
material to minors, though it would not be able to do the same to adults, as
sexual material is deemed "obscene" to minors but not to adults.44 The State
argued that the court should extend this doctrine to violent materials.45 How-
ever, the court distinguished Ginsberg as a case invoking the United States
Supreme Court's First Amendment obscenity jurisprudence, which involves
unprotected sex-based expression, as opposed to violence-based expression,
which is generally afforded broad protection under the First Amendment.46
In addition, other circuits have refused to classify violent materials with sex-
ually-explicit materials as "obscene" within the context of the First Amend-
ment.4 7 Consequently, the court settled on strict scrutiny as the appropriate
standard of review to apply to the Act.48
The court then held the Act unconstitutional under strict scrutiny as an
impermissible content-based restriction on speech. In order to survive strict
scrutiny, the disputed state action must be narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling governmental interest.49 Additionally, the government must use the
least restrictive alternative available to serve its purpose.50 Here, the Califor-
nia State Legislature offered two purportedly compelling interests in passing
the Act: (1) "preventing violent, aggressive, and antisocial behavior" and (2)
"preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors who play violent
video games."51 With respect to the first interest, the court stated that the
government may not prohibit speech simply "because it increases the chance
an unlawful act may be committed at some indefinite future time."52
Regarding the second interest, the Ninth Circuit conceded that the "Su-
preme Court has recognized a compelling interest in protecting the physical
ies, which the Court has long determined are entitled to First Amendment
protection).
42. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
43. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 957-58.
44. Id. at 959- 60.
45. Id. at 960
46. Id. (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640).
47. See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Eclipse
Enter., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
48. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 960.
49. Id. at 961.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 961 (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002)).
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and psychological well-being of minors."53 However, in order for the gov-
ernment's action to be narrowly tailored to serve this interest, it must
"demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that
the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way."54 The court stated that deference to the California State Legislature is
not appropriate here because it failed to draw reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence.55 The court enumerated the following considerations
that tend to expose the tenuous relationship between violent video games and
actual psychological harm: (1) the relative scarcity of scholarly literature on
the subject; (2) many of the existing studies on the subject are methodologi-
cally flawed; (3) many support the opposite inference,56 finding more aggres-
sion in the eighteen and older range than in minors; (4) the studies relied
upon by the State relate to the aggression of players against others, which is
not the interest purported by the State in the case at bar; and (5) there has
been no persuasive causal link established between violent video games and
aggressive behavior-in fact, one of the studies relied upon by the State ex-
pressly disclaims that "causality was not studied."57 Accordingly, the court
determined that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a com-
pelling interest.58
The court also held that the State failed to demonstrate that the Act is
the least restrictive means available to prevent psychological or neurological
harm to minors who play violent video games. 59 It identified two less-re-
strictive means that have already been implemented, in California and else-
where, to deal with the concerns that arise from the effect of violent video
games on today's youth: (1) the Entertainment Software Rating Board
(ESRB) rating system, which assigns games an advisory rating reflecting its
determination of the appropriate age group to play the games; and (2) paren-
tal controls on modern gaming systems which allow parents to restrict their
53. Id.
54. Id. at 962 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)
(plurality op.)).
55. Id.
56. See Jim Sterling, Buddhist Monk Recommends Games for Treating Aggres-
sion, Sept. 21, 2009, http://www.destructoid.com/buddhist-monk-recommends-
games-for-treating-aggression- 149304.phtml (Trinley Dorje, holding the title of
Karmapa Lama, the only Buddhist leader recognized by China, India, and Ti-
bet, is quoted as saying "the aggression that comes out in the video game sati-
ates whatever desire I might have to express that feeling. For me, that's very
skillful because when I do that I don't have to go and hit anyone over the
head.").
57. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 963-64.
58. Id. at 964.
59. Id. at 965.
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children's access to games they deem inappropriate.60 The Ninth Circuit
took issue with the State's obfuscation of the proper analysis by arguing why
it should be permitted to use the "most effective" means instead of the least
restrictive.61
Moving on to the Act's labeling requirement, the court noted that, in
general, "freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people
what they must say."62 However, it also noted that less constitutional protec-
tion is afforded to commercial speech.63 State compulsion of commercial
speech is constitutionally permissible if the required inclusion consists of
"purely factual and uncontroversial information."64 The court stated that,
normally, it would inquire into whether the Act's labeling requirement was
entitled to full First Amendment protection because it was "inextricably in-
tertwined" with otherwise fully-protected speech,65 or only entitled to the
lesser amount of First Amendment protection as separable commercial
speech.66 However, the court determined that, due to its earlier holding that
the Act is unconstitutional, it need not address this distinction because the
labeling requirement fails even under the broader "factual information and
deception prevention" standard elucidated in Zauderer.67 Because the Act is
unconstitutional-and the State is consequently powerless to prosecute a
video game retailer for selling or renting violent video games to minors-any
label informing consumers that they must be eighteen or older to purchase
the game would be erroneous (i.e., not factual).68 Furthermore, the court held
that the labeling requirement fails the rational relationship test established in
Zauderer, which asks if the "disclosure requirements are reasonably related
to the State's interest in preventing deception of customers."69 The State
argued that the labeling requirement achieved this goal because consumers
would otherwise be deceived by the ESRB age rating system already imple-
mented for video games.70 However, the court determined that, because the
Act is invalid and cannot mandate an age threshold for the purchase or rental
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 966 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 61 (2006)).
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)).
65. Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 966-67.
69. Idat 967 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
70. See id.
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of violent video games, the labeling requirement would actually be convey-
ing false information (buying the game as a minor is unlawful), and "the
State has no legitimate reason to force retailers to affix false information on
their products."7
VII. CRITIQUE OF COURT'S APPROACH
Long gone are the days when video-game violence amounted to no
more than a yellow pie with a slice cut out of it gobbling up white pellets and
the occasional blue ghost. Advancements in technology are continually lead-
ing to improved graphics, physics, in-game immersion, and above all, real-
ism. As a result, video games better portray violence, cruelty, depravity, and
torture. But this same technological advancement enables games to tell a
better story, evoke more powerful emotions from players, propagate fiercer
competition, and pursue other socially-healthy endeavors. Video games are
art, just as deserving of First Amendment protection as other artistic media,
and, likewise, have the potential to be manipulated in any manner the artist
deems fit.72
These factors, in conjunction with the growing popularity of video
games, have led to concerns among parents and overzealous legislators about
the effect such games are having on today's youth. However, a blanket pro-
scription on the sale and rental of violent video games is not the answer. A
state legislature certainly has the authority, pursuant to its police powers, to
enact legislation for the benefit and welfare of its minors. Nevertheless, such
legislation must comport with constitutional standards. Thus, in order for a
state's regulation of the sale or rental of violent video games to minors to
survive strict scrutiny in the future, the causal relationship between playing
violent video games and mental illness, antisocial behavior, or actual vio-
lence in minors must be established to the satisfaction of the courts. This
will presumably transform a blanket prohibition on the sale and rental of
violent video games to minors into a narrowly-tailored means of preventing
aggressive behavior and psychological harm in minors, which has already
been recognized as a compelling governmental interest.73 But until this hap-
pens, and I surmise that it never will, legislatures need to realize that the First
Amendment does not permit the government to impose its own notions of
what is too violent for this nation's youth without a compelling reason. And
even then, the district court in Schwarzenegger expressed doubt that "even if
a causal link exists between violent video games and violent behavior, the
7 1. Id.
72. See St. Louis County, 329 F.3d at 957 (holding violent video games to be a
form of protected speech under the First Amendment by analogizing them to
other storytelling mediums).
73. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 961.
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First Amendment allows a state to restrict access to violent video games,
even for those under eighteen years of age."74
In addition, this case is an example of judicial temperance as a check on
otherwise unrestrained legislative activism. Contrary to established constitu-
tional principles, the California State Legislature nevertheless enacted the
Act as highly visible and publicized patronage to its constituents.75 While it
is ordinarily not the province of the courts to second-guess legislative deter-
minations of how best to promote the health, safety, and welfare of its citi-
zens, such deference is not warranted when the legislative measure seeks to
address a phantom harm. Had the California State Legislature chosen instead
to criminalize minors attending "violent" movies or purchasing "violent" mu-
sic, it would have been just as obliged to present compelling evidence to the
court establishing the causal connection between these mediums and psycho-
logical harm to minors. The only distinction that makes the Act challenged
in Schwarzenegger less preposterous in the eyes of society is the stigma at-
tached to video games as a storytelling medium.
As far as the impact of the court's holding on First Amendment juris-
prudence, it will not be regarded as revolutionary. The decision neither
makes new law nor carves out new exceptions from existing law; it merely
applies settled law to facts nearly identical to those dealt with by other
courts. Indeed, this case should go down in the annals of the Federal Re-
porter as a prime example of the proper application of the United States Su-
preme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. Such jurisprudence has
consistently limited the content that falls within the First Amendment analy-
sis of "obscenity" to sexual material.76 Likewise, it has just as consistently
declined to extend obscenity to include exclusively violent material.77 Thus,
the First Amendment mandates the application of strict scrutiny to impermis-
sible content-based restrictions on speech.78 The Ninth Circuit applied these
well-established principles to the Act and correctly concluded that the Act
cannot stand when evaluated against strict scrutiny.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Schwarzenegger is indicative of the proper judicial temperament
74. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
75. See William Finn Bennett, Bill Would Restrict Children's Access to Violent
Video Games, N. COUNTY TiMES, Oct. 4, 2005, http://www.nctimes.com/news/
local/article_32aecc I 8-4455-52b7-8cO3-174cl0eca235.html.
76. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 959.
77. See Eclipse Enter., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63,71 (2d Cir. 1997)71; see also
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992).
78. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expres-
sion because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.").
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with regard to legislative enactments rooted in dubious social science. Under
this nation's current First Amendment jurisprudence, any governmental at-
tempt to regulate the sale or rental of violent video games will be met with
strict scrutiny as an impermissible content-based restriction on speech. Thus,
passing such an enactment is always going to be a risky endeavor. Neverthe-
less, given the resentment toward video games arising from parents and other
groups-which is largely a product of ignorance and lack of experience with
video games-I predict such legislative measures will continue to be popu-
larly perceived as politically savvy. However, as the Ninth Circuit implicitly
recognizes in Schwarzenegger, the decision on what is appropriate entertain-
ment for minors rests most properly with the parents. After all, they certainly
did not elect their state legislators to raise their kids for them.

